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Richter considers that Nietzsche's importance lies in having compelled a considerable reformation in our understanding of what is essential to religion, in having forced new attention to the doctrine that the moral personality must be autonomous, in having broadened our humanitarian ideals, and in having been himself the embodiment of a new and future type of profoundly religious man. If the essence of religion is the emotional acceptance of what one considers the deepest nature of the real, then Nietzsche may stand as an example of religious zeal in his cult of life and force.

In his teaching concerning the superman Nietzsche's concept underwent considerable change, and Richter argues, with some detail of quotation, that in its biological and historical aspects the later form of it is in clear contradiction to the earlier. The earliest doctrine is based on a complete acceptance of Darwinism, and holds that, just as there has been continual progress in the evolutionary series leading up to man, so there must be progress from present man to a still higher future race. In the next periods Nietzsche introduces the idea of the eternal cycle, shifts away from the belief that present man is really a biological culmination, and begins to drop the idea that there can be produced a whole race of beings who shall be higher than the highest who have already lived. The final doctrine is the denial of progress by natural selection, the complete abandonment of the hope of a new biological species in a far distant future, the belief that the superhuman type has already often appeared, and the belief that our aim should be simply such intelligent, selective breeding among the present mixed and degenerate races of men as to produce dominating individuals more frequently.

Discussing Nietzsche's views on women, marriage, and children, Richter gives some account of what is known of Nietzsche's own relations with women, noting his antipathy to any libertine practise, and his apparently abnormal lack of sex-instinct intensity. Admitting the exaggeration and the self-contradictions in his comments on women and the right relations between the sexes, Richter urges that Nietzsche's forward-looking ideals, and his war on mere sentimentalism in social problems, have in fact strongly aided the advance of a broad humanity.

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Das Realitätsproblem. Von MAX FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1912.—pp. 98.

This work is a compact restatement of the main position taken in the author's earlier work, *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit* (Leipzig, 1912). While many details of the earlier work are here omitted, the author has profited by criticism and discussion; the argument is presented with greater clearness, and the references to differing positions are illuminating.

The author rejects logical idealism (Lotze) and psychological idealism (Berkeley, Mill) as unable to give any meaning to 'real existence.' The former throws existence as a merely logical predicate into a system of thought

relations, a system that cannot be characterized as existent in any way that distinguishes it from any other possible system. The latter, while it grounds reality in concrete sensations, leaves these in the sphere of subjective, individual experience, and can assign to the objects and laws of nature a reality which again is only logical.

But sensations and their logical elaboration do not exhaust experience. There are elements of value which are not products of thought activity or mere sensational content, yet which belong to primitive, immediate experience (*Erlebnis*). Some of these (Shaftesbury, Bergson, Dilthey, Rickert) are examined, and found not to afford an adequate basis for judgments of reality. These the author finds to be rooted in an original sense of activity, which carries with it the recognition of real things as objects, hindrances or instruments of our actions. This reality is not an inference of scientific thought, but a presupposition of all scientific activity. The presentation of this position is extremely acute and significant. Only two or three phases can be mentioned here.

Theory forms but one side of our scientific activity. Science springs out of our practical needs, is tested by its applications, is the means by which we master and re-create our world, and is bound from first to last to our active life. It brings our activities into a connected system (*sie ist ein Wirkungszusammenhang*). The very objects which science thus systematizes are primarily objects of our activity.

The most primitive sensations contain this factor; it belongs to their original character that they are significant for action, and limit it. We are not passive spectators of a panorama of sensations, but are in constant reciprocal commerce with them. In this original sense of action lies the experience (*Erleben*) of reality, a germ which is indefinitely differentiated and corrected in the development of science, but which is presupposed and not produced by science. So when science transforms our world into a system of mathematically related non-qualitative objects in space, this represents but one aspect of a process that must rest at last upon direct experience of action.

The distinction between living and non-living objects is a differentiation of this original sense of reality, which contains both as aspects of one experience. As in one direction there is a constant tendency to mechanize the whole physical world, in the other direction the sense of living reality is centered at the single point of persons. The mental and social sciences accordingly have precisely as good standing (though not yet an equally exact formulation) as the physical.

From this 'empirical' treatment the author excludes the principles of 'pure' mathematical and logical science. Were it not for this, nearly the whole of his position could be taken over into an instrumental theory of knowledge; and instrumental logic would profit by the consideration of some of his points.

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